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A PROPOSED LEGAL ADVISOR'S ROADMAP FOR
SOFTWARE DEVELOPERS: ON THE SHOULDERS OF
GIANTS MAY No BREACHERS OF ECONOMIC
RELATIONSHIPS NOR SLAVISH COPIERS
STAND
BY
JOHN T. SOMA* ROBERT D. SPRAGUE**
M. SusAN LOMBARDI*** CAROLYN M. LINDH****
INTRODUCTION
Computer programs are literary works entitled to copyright protec-
tion under federal law. Although this may seem common knowledge
today, until recently courts were still being asked to determine whether
computer programs were entitled to any copyright protection at all.
The debate began when the first microcomputers became available in
the mid-1970s and the number of people using computers increased
dramatically. By 1980, companies such as Tandy, Commodore, and Ap-
ple all offered a complete line of microcomputers. IBM, then the largest
computer company in the world, entered the market in 1981 with the
extremely popular microcomputer called the PC (Personal Computer).'
Much of the software for the early microcomputers was shareware or
public domain.2 Many of the initial software developers were one- or
two-person companies, usually run out of the programmers' basements
or garages. Overall, the microcomputer software industry was small,
unstable, and unorganized, and developers did not vigorously seek
copyright protection.
During the 1980s, however, microcomputer software development
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1. A "Personal Computer" or "PC" is a microcomputer-a computer which operates
with a microprocessor. The terms PC, personal computer and microcomputer are, both in
general usage and in this article, considered synonymous.
2. Shareware is software distributed initially without charge or for a nominal fee. If
the user likes the program and uses it, he or she is encouraged to send a registration fee to
the software's author. Public domain software has no proprietary rights attached. The
software can be freely copied and distributed without charge.
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became a multi-billion dollar industry with tens of thousands of employ-
ees. Small startups such as Microsoft Corporation and Lotus Develop-
ment Corporation began to approach one billion dollars per year in
sales. As software developers established major positions in the market
and began to appreciate the money to be made, they wanted protection
for their products. And, for the first time, they had the money to seek
such protection.
Developers initially turned to the copyright laws for protection, but
found them to be inadequate. Responding to this demand for protec-
tion, courts and Congress over the last fifteen years have refined the
copyright laws to accommodate computer programs. Lotus Development
Corp. v. Paperback Software International8 is the most recent in a long line
of such software protection cases. To better understand the holding in
Lotus, the practitioner should be familiar with the development of
software copyright cases and laws during the last fifteen years.
This article is intended to aid the practitioner in understanding the
direction software copyright case law is taking. To do so, the article will
review past cases and offer insight into the Lotus decision. Further, it will
assist the practitioner in advising a software development client as to
both what to do and not to do to avoid future copyright infringement
litigation. Finally, the graphic "roadmap" provided will not only guide
the practitioner through past cases, but also give direction for safe pas-
sage in the future.
Section I of this article offers a brief overview of the history and
development of the copyright acts. Section II provides a background of
the court-derived copyright laws, while section III reviews the more sig-
nificant software copyright cases of the last fifteen years. It is the con-
tention of the authors that these cases can be separated into three
generations of software copyright cases, with each successive generation
constantly expanding the legal envelope of protection. Section IV then
provides a thorough analysis of the Lotus case. Section V follows with a
chart of approximately 25 cases which can be used to help the practi-
tioner predict a future case. Finally, section VI will attempt to predict
the future of copyright law based upon the decisions discussed in this
article.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
COPYRIGHT AcTs
The United States Constitution authorizes Congress to pass laws
"To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries." '4 This provision gives Congress the
authority to confer monopolies to the extent it deems necessary to pro-
3. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
4. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, ci. 8. The copyright laws, codified in Title 17 of the United
States Code, rest upon this explicit grant of legislative authority.
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mote learning, culture and development. 5 Monopolies are not granted
solely for the purpose of rewarding authors. Rather, Congress has
granted copyright monopolies to serve the public welfare by encourag-
ing authors to generate new ideas and disclose them to the public, being
free to do so in any uniquely expressed way they choose.
6
In deciding the nature of the copyright laws, however, Congress
must strike a balance between encouraging new expression and allowing
that new expression to be used by others. 7 Achieving the proper bal-
ance has been a painstaking task.
[Courts] must take care to guard against two extremes equally
prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed
their time for the service of the community, may not be de-
prived of their just merits, and the reward for their ingenuity
and labour; the other, that the world may not be deprived of
improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded.
8
It was with these goals in mind that Congress passed the first Copy-
right Act in 1790. 9 The 1790 Act attempted to list all the items that
would be granted copyright protection. This list soon proved inade-
quate. 10 In 1909 Congress changed its approach and extended protec-
tion to "all the writings of an author." 1' Even this general statement
proved to be too inflexible to accommodate advances in technology.'
2
In the mid-1950s, Congress began consideration of another major revi-
5. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v.Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
6. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
7. If Congress were to determine, for example, that copyright protection is un-
necessary to "promote the progress of" computer programming-because, for
example, in Congress' view the financial incentives alone of developing new com-
puter programs (without the added benefit of copyright) are enough to en-
courage innovation, or because incremental innovation might be stifled by
expansive copyright protection-then Congress could, without offending the
Constitution, provide no copyright protection for computer programs. At the
other extreme, were Congress to find that strong copyright protection is neces-
sary to promote the progress of computer programming, Congress could provide
for expansive copyright protection for all aspects of computer programs, again
without having strayed beyond the bounds of the constitutionally permissible.
Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 46.
8. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1235 n. 27, quoting Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 n.6
(1785) (Lord Mansfield).
9. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831). This Act ex-
tended copyright protection to "any map, chart, book or books already printed."
10. Congress expanded copyright protection by adding "designs, prints, etchings and
engravings" in 1802, "musical composition" in 1831, "dramatic composition" in 1856,
"photographs and the negatives thereof" in 1865, and "statuary" and "models or designs
intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts" in 1870. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36,
§ 2, 2 Stat. 171, 171, repealed by Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 14, 4 Stat. 436, 436, 439,
amended by Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138, 139, amended by Act of Mar. 3, 1865,
ch. 126, §§ 1, 2, 13 Stat. 540, 540, repealed by Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat.
198, 212 (repealed 1909).
11. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 4, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (previously codified at 17
U.S.C. § 4, reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. App. § 4 (West Supp. 1990); recodified 1947; repealed
1976).
12. In 1912, Congress added "motion pictures" as a further example of"all the writ-
ings of an author," Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, § 5(1)-(m), 37 Stat. 488,488 (previously
codified at 17 U.S.C. § 5(l)-(m), reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. App. § 5(1)-(m), recodified 1947,
repealed 1976), and in 1972, Congress added "sound recordings" to the list, Act of Oct.
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sion of the copyright law. It was not until 1976, however, that Congress
passed a new copyright act.' 3 The Copyright Act of 1976 extended
copyright protection to: "original works of authorship fixed in any tan-
gible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device."' 4
The 1976 Act also codified the judicially created doctrine of the
idea versus expression dichotomy. Section 102(b) states that "[i]n no
case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."' 15 The Copyright
Act of 1976 also impliedly extended copyright protection to computer
programs. Congress, in the legislative history for the Act, dearly stated
that computer programs were considered literary works and were pro-
tected by copyright laws.
16
Further changes to the Copyright Act were forthcoming. In 1978,
the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works (CONTU), a committee formed by Congress to investigate copy-
right protection for new technologies, delivered its report to Con-
gress. 17 CONTU recommended two changes to the Copyright Act: (1)
the Act should include a definition of a computer program and (2) allow
copies of computer programs for archival purposes.' 8 In 1980, Con-
gress amended the Copyright Act and included both of CONTU's rec-
ommendations. 19 The 1976 Act and its 1980 Amendment provide the
basis for the courts' analyses in the copyright cases discussed in sections
III and IV of this article.
20
15, 1971, Pub. L. 92-140, § 1(b), 85 Stat. 391, 391 (previously codified at 17 U.S.C. § 5(n),
reprnted in 17 U.S.C.A. App. § 5(n), repealed 1976).
13. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-801).
14. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
15. Id. at § 102(b).
16. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5664-67, 5731.
17. CONTU's purpose was to study the use of the copyright laws for "automatic sys-
tems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, and transferring information", and to
make recommendations to ensure that such works were protected by the copyright laws.
Act of Dec. 31 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 201(b)-(c), 88 Stat. 1873, 1873-74 (1974).
18. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEw TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
20-21 (1978), reprinted in 5 COPYRIGHT, CONGRESS AND TECHNOLOGY: THE PUBLIC RECORD
(N. Henry ed. 1980).
19. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, §§ 9-10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified at
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988)). The Copyright Act currently defines a computer program as "[a]
set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to
bring about a certain result." Id.
20. One commentator believes that the 1976 Act and the 1980 Amendment are not
adequate protection for software developers, and has suggested amending the Copyright
Act again. See Abramson, Why Lotus-Paperback Uses the Wrong Test and What the New Software
Protection Legislation Should Look Like, COMPUTER LAw., August 1990 at 6.
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II. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF COPYRIGHT LAW AS IT RELATES TO
COMPUTER SOFTWARE
The fundamental basis of copyright law is that only the expression
of a work is subject to protection, not its underlying idea. To establish
copyright infringement, both ownership and copying must be proved.
2 1
Ownership requires originality and copyrightability of the subject mat-
ter.2 2 Copying requires proof of access and substantial similarity of the
two works. 2 3 Copyright infringement of computer software can first
be separated into two distinct categories based upon what part of the
work is copied: (1) literal elements and (2) non-literal elements. The
source code and object code of computer programs constitute the literal
elements. 24 Literal aspects of a computer program are clearly
copyrightable.
2 5
In general, the user interface-the part of the computer program
which the user sees and uses to interact with the program-is the non-
literal aspect of the expression. Courts have long recognized that non-
literal expressions of a work can be copyrightable and subject to protec-
tion.2 6 When the alleged copying is of literal elements, substantial simi-
larity is established by showing duplication of the original work or
substantial portions of it. Establishing substantial similarity of non-lit-
eral elements is much more difficult. In determining the substantial sim-
21. Warner Bros. v. Amer. Broadcasting Cos., 654 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1981); Man-
ufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 990 (D. Conn. 1989); 3 M.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01 at 13-14 (1990).
22. Ownership also requires the author to be a U.S. citizen and proper registration of
the copyright. If the plaintiff is not the author of the work, then the plaintiff must be an
assignee of the copyright. In all the cases discussed in this article, these elements are not
at issue and are, therefore, not considered pertinent. For further discussion concerning
these elements, see 3 M. NiMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.01[A] (1990).
23. Proof by direct evidence of copying is generally not possible since the actual
act of copying is rarely witnessed or recorded. Normally, there is no physical
proof of copying other than the offending object itself. Copying therefore is gen-
erally established by showing that the defendant had access to the copyrighted
work and that the offending and copyrighted articles are 'substantially similar.'
Atari, Inc. v. North Amer. Phillips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, 843 F.2d 600,606 (Ist Cir. 1988). See also
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT supra note 21 at § 13.01.
24. Source code is the program written in a programming language such as Pascal or
BASIC. Object code is the machine readable code, that is, the binary representation of the
source code. A command written in source code is translated into object code in order for
the computer to interpret the command. See Lotus, 740 F. Supp. 37, 43-45 for a further
discussion of the literal aspects of computer programs.
25. See Id. at 45 for a list of cases supporting the holding "that literal manifestations of
a computer program-including both source code and object code-if original, are
copyrightable."
26. "[A]n infringement is not confined to literal and exact repetition or reproduction;
it includes also the various modes in which the matter of any work may be adopted, imi-
tated, transferred, or reproduced, with more or less colorable alterations to disguise the
piracy." Universal Pictures Co., Inc. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.
1947).
And, as Judge Learned Hand stated, copyright "cannot be limited literally to the text,
else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations." Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). See also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc.
v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977).
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ilarity between two computer programs based upon non-literal
elements, courts have used three basic approaches: (1) the "abstrac-
tions" test, (2) the "idea/expression dichotomy" test, and (3) the "look
and feel" test.
A. The Abstractions Test
The abstractions test was developed by Judge Learned Hand in
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co. :27
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of
patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more
and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be
no more than the most general statement of what the play is
about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a
point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer
protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use
of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his prop-
erty is never extended.
28
In other words, an author cannot claim protection for a basic plot such
as "boy meets girl," nor can protection be claimed because the plot un-
folds in a particular city. But where the plot, location, types of charac-
ters, and segments of dialogue all start to become substantially similar,
the elements of the work then begin to constitute more of an expression
subject to protection than of abstract ideas.
29
The critical step under the abstractions test, therefore, is distilling
the unprotected idea from the protected expression.3 0 Applying the ab-
stractions test has led to a two-step analysis to determine substantial
similarity between two works: applying first an "extrinsic test," and then
an "intrinsic test."3 1 Under the initial extrinsic test, the court will dis-
sect and analyze the basic components of a work (i.e., the type of work
involved, the materials used, the subject matter, and the setting for the
subject), to determine "whether there are sufficient articulable similari-
ties to justify a finding that the defendant has copied from the protected
work."
32
If copying is established under the extrinsic test, the court then ap-
plies the intrinsic test to determine whether copying has occurred to the
extent that the two works are substantially similar. The basis of the test
applied in deciding whether there is substantial similarity in expressions
is "the response of the ordinary reasonable person."'3
3
In applying the abstractions test, the court in Sid & Marty Krofft Tele-
27. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (copyright infringement of a play by a motion picture).
28. Id. at 121 (citations omitted).
29. Id.
30. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1163 (9th Cir. 1977).
31. Id. at 1164.
32. Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, 843 F.2d 600, 608, relying upon,
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
33. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164, relying upon, Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468-69.
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vision Production, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.34 stated that if "there is substan-
tial similarity in ideas, then the trier of fact must decide whether there is
substantial similarity in the expressions of the ideas so as to constitute
infringement."' 35 This test has led to an evolution of the basic test to
establish copyright infringement when analyzing non-literal elements:
"To establish copyright infringement, the plaintiff must prove owner-
ship of the work in question, access to the work by the defendant, and
substantial similarity of both the general ideas and the expression of
those ideas between the plaintiff's and defendant's work."
3 6
B. Idea/Expression Dichotomy
The idea/expression dichotomy attempts to differentiate between
an idea and its expression. This test was first applied in Baker v. Selden.3 7
As noted in Lotus, the Baker Court held that:
the text of a book describing a special method of double-entry
accounting on paper spreadsheets-the now almost universal
T-accounts system-was copyrightable expression, but that the
method itself, which embodied the idea of this particular kind
of double-entry bookkeeping, was not. The Court thus con-
cluded that Baker did not infringe Selden's copyright when
Baker wrote his own treatise, in his own words, describing the
special double-entry method of bookkeeping.
38
If it is determined that the idea and its expression are indistinguish-
able, and that there is no greater similarity between the works than is
inevitable from the expression of that idea, then any copying of that par-
ticular expression will essentially be excused because there is no other
way to express that idea. The idea and expression have merged.3 9 Con-
versely, "the scope of copyright protection increases with the extent ex-
pression differs from the idea." 40
C. Look and Feel
The origination of the look and feel concept is credited to Roth
Greeting Cards v. United Card Co.,41 in which the court considered whether
greeting cards created by the defendant infringed upon the plaintiff's
cards. In dissecting various elements of expression of the plaintiff's
cards, the court noted:
the textual matter of each card, considered apart from its ar-
34. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
35. Id.
36. Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. dened,
485 U.S. 977 (1988) (emphasis in original), citing Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
37. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
38. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l., 740 F. Supp. 37, 54 (D. Mass.
1990).
39. Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Vector Intercontinental, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 135, 139
(N.D. Ohio 1986).
40. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1168.
41. 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970).
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rangement on the cards and its association with artistic repre-
sentations, was not original to Roth and therefore not
copyrightable. However, proper analysis of the problem re-
quires that all elements of each card, including text, arrange-
ment of text, art work, and association between art work and
text, be considered as a whole.
4 2
The Roth court, keeping in mind that it was protecting expression
and not ideas, determined that plaintiff's cards, taken as a whole, were
copyrightable. 43 In determining whether there was a substantial similar-
ity between the two works, the court held that "in total concept and feel the
cards of United are the same as the copyrighted cards of Roth."
44
III. THREE GENERATIONS OF COMPUTER COPYRIGHT CASES
The 1976 Copyright Act and the 1980 Amendment extended copy-
right protection to computer programs. The degree of protection ex-
tended, however, was left to the courts. The cases applying copyright
protection to computer programs can be separated into three genera-
tions. The first generation of software copyright cases dealt with frag-
mented literal copying consisting mainly of the copying of substantial
portions of the source and object codes. In the second generation, the
courts began to consider the extent non-literal aspects of computer pro-
grams were protected. The courts' focus was on the structure of the
source and object code. The third generation of cases further extended
protection of non-literal elements, focusing on the structure and organi-
zation of the user interface.
A. The First Generation
The first generation of software copyright cases culminated with Ap-
ple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.4 5 Prior to Apple, the courts
generally recognized the copyrightability of the source code of com-
puter programs. The basic definition in the 1980 amendment made it
clear that Congress intended to protect the source code.4 6 Apple pro-
vided the court with the novel issue of whether the object code of a
program and a program embedded in read-only memory (ROM) chips
were copyrightable. The defendant in Apple, Franklin Computer Corpo-
ration, manufactured and sold the ACE 100 personal computer which
was designed to be "Apple compatible." In order to be Apple compati-
42. Id. at 1109 (footnote omitted).
43. Considering all of these elements together, the Roth cards are, in our opin-
ion, both original and copyrightable. In reaching this conclusion we recognize
that copyright protection is not available for ideas, but only for the tangible ex-
pression of ideas. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217, 74 S. Ct. 460, 98 L. Ed. 630
(1954). We conclude that each of Roth's cards, considered as a whole, represents
a tangible expression of an idea and that such expression was, in totality, created
by Roth.
Id. at 1109-10 (citation omitted).
44. Id. at 1110 (emphasis added). See also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. Inc., v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
45. 714 F.2d 1240 (3rd Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
46. See supra n. 19.
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ble, Franklin copied Apple's operating system verbatim.4 7 Apple sued
Franklin for copyright infringement. Franklin raised two defenses based
upon the non-copyrightability of the subject matter: (1) object code and
programs embedded in ROM were not copyrightable subject matter and
(2) operating systems were not copyrightable subject matter.4 8
Franklin asserted that the object code was not copyrightable be-
cause of the 1908 case of White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.
4 9
In White-Smith, the Supreme Court had drawn a distinction between
works that could be interpreted by individuals, and those that required a
machine to interpret the work. The Apple court found that both the 1976
Act and its legislative history clearly intended to "obliterate distinctions
engendered by White-Smith." 50 Under the Act, copyright protection ex-
tends to works in any tangible forms which can be "perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device." 5 1 In addition, the definition of a computer pro-
gram includes "sets of statements or instructions to be used directly or
indirectly in a computer."' 52 The Third Circuit concluded that a com-
puter program, whether in object code or source code, was a "literary
work" and was protected from unauthorized copying, whether from its
object or source code version.
53
The Apple court also rejected Franklin's second argument that oper-
ating systems were not copyrightable. This argument was based upon
the premise that operating systems are methods or processes. 54 The
court reasoned that if the instructions in an application program are not
methods or processes, then by analogy neither are the instructions in a
system program. The court relied on the CONTU report which stated
that works of a program which are "used ultimately in the implementa-
tion of a process should in no way affect their copyrightability." 5 5 Apple
clearly established that application programs and operating systems, in
either object or source code form, are copyrightable.
B. The Second Generation
The second generation of software copyright cases, represented by
Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. ,56 extended protec-
tion to the structure, sequence and organization (non-literal aspects) of
47. There was evidence at trial that Franklin had blatantly copied Apple's programs.
Franklin had even left in the object code the name of the original programmer and the
original program's name, "Applesoft." Apple, 714 F.2d at 1245.
48. Id. at 1249.
49. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
50. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1240, 1248.
51. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1249.
54. The Copyright Act does not protect a method or process. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(1988).
55. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1252 (quoting NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 1 (1979) at 21).
56. 797 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir. 1986), cerl. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
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a program's source and object code. The plaintiff, Whelan Associates,
developed a program for the operation of a dental laboratory for the
defendant, Jaslow Dental Laboratories. The program, Dentalab, was
written in Event Driven Language for the IBM Series One computer.
Jaslow and Whelan entered into a licensing agreement which authorized
Whelan to sell Dentalab and to pay Jaslow a ten percent royalty on all
sales. Jaslow used Dentalab for two years. Jaslow later realized, how-
ever, that if the program was converted to BASIC programming lan-
guage, it could be used on a wider variety of personal computers. Jaslow
thereafter developed and marketed its own version of the program in
BASIC. Jaslow was ultimately sued for infringing Whelan's copyright of
the software written in Event Driven Language. The Whelan court was
presented with the issue of whether the structure and organization of
the computer code could be infringed. The court analyzed the issue
under the idea/expression dichotomy. Jaslow argued that the computer
program's structure was the idea, not the expression. The court re-
jected Jaslow's argument based upon the distinction made in Baker v.
Selden 5 7 between an idea and an expression. The Whelan court noted
that in Baker, the purpose or function of the work was the idea, and
everything else was the expression.5 8 The Whelan court then deter-
mined that the idea of Dentalab was the efficient management of a den-
tal laboratory and the expression was everything else, including the
structure of the program. The court noted that the Copyright Act of
1976 implicitly protects the sequence, order, or structure of a work:
Although the Code does not use the terms "sequence," "or-
der" or "structure," it is clear from the definition of compila-
tions and derivative works, and the protection afforded them,
that Congress was aware of the fact that the sequencing and
ordering of materials could be copyrighted.... [T]he sequence
and order could be parts of the expression, not the idea. 59
Jaslow next contended that if the structure was "expression," then it
merged with the idea. The court reasoned that since the program's
structure could be written in a variety of ways, the structure did not
merge with the idea.
60
The Whelan decision has been criticized for misapplying the idea/
expression dichotomy. The court identified the idea underlying the pro-
gram and then decided that everything else was expression. In so doing,
the court assumed that there could only be one idea in every program.
Certain functions of a computer can only be performed a particular way,
usually because of hardware configurations or the programming lan-
guage involved. Additionally, certain types of programs require a cer-
tain basic structure. To assume, however, that there was only one idea
57. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
58. 797 F.2d at 1236. Cf. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp.
775, 783 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aft'd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Apple seeks here not to
protect ideas, (i.e., making the machine perform particular functions) but rather to protect
their particular expressions .....
59. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1239.
60. Id. at 1236.
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underlying the program was erroneous. The court should have applied
the abstractions test to ascertain whether there were other ideas not sub-
ject to protection.
Whelan extended copyright law further than other courts. The
Third Circuit effectively prohibited developers from producing substan-
tially similar source and object codes. Courts will not extend protection
to source and object codes beyond this point. Whelan set the stage for
the third generation in copyright protection where the issue became
whether the copyright laws protect the structure, sequence, and organi-
zation of a program's user interface.
C. The Third (and Final?) Generation
In the third generation of software copyright cases, courts have
struggled with the question of what other non-literal aspects of a com-
puter program are protected. There are three major third generation
cases.
Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co.61 is generally rec-
ognized as the first case to decide if a computer program's user interface
is copyrightable. Synercom developed a program to test the tolerance
levels of a building. The program had an easier and more efficient
method to input data on format cards. The format cards had lines and
shaded areas that told "the user what data to place where and how to do
it."'62 The input forms had been properly copyrighted. The defendant,
Engineering Dynamics, Inc. (EDI) developed another program that
competed with Synercom's program. In fact, EDI believed that to com-
pete in the marketplace, its new program had to be wholly compatible
with Synercom's data input format.63 EDI did not copy the format cards
themselves, but instead wrote a program to accept data from Synercom's
input format cards. 64
The Synercom court began its analysis by using the idea/expression
dichotomy, approaching this issue differently, however, than did the
Whelan court. In Whelan, the court tried to discern what the idea was
behind the program, whereas in Synercom, the court tried to discern
"whether the material proffered for copyright undertakes to express." 65
Judge Higginbotham found that the input format did express an idea.
The lines, shading, and words communicated to the user the selection,
arrangement and sequence of data.66 The issue presented was: "If se-
61. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (Although it was decided in 1978, this case is
identified with the third generation because it addressed issues not generally raised until
the mid-1980s, and is often distinguished in the holdings of third-generation cases.).
62. Id. at 1012.
63. Id. at 1008.
64. Id. at 1012.
65. Id. at 1011.
66. Generally, blank forms are not the subject of copyright. See Baker v. Selden, 101
U.S. 99 (1879); Aldrich v. Remington Rand, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Tex. 1942).
"Forms" which communicate information can, however, be the subject of copyright. See
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
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quencing and ordering [was] expression, what separable idea [was] ex-
pressed?"'6 7 If the idea was the sequence and ordering of data, there
was no infringement; if, however, sequencing and ordering of data was
the expression, there was an infringement.
6 8
Judge Higginbotham resolved this issue with the now classic exam-
ple of the "figure-H" pattern in manual transmission automobiles which
he analogized to the input formats used in the program. Once a manu-
facturer chose the "figure-H," it was the only pattern that would work in
that particular model of car. The "figure-H" may be expressed in sev-
eral different ways. It can be described in a driver's manual, through a
diagram, photograph, or driver training film. Each of these expressions
may be protected through copyright, but a copyright does not prohibit
another manufacturer from marketing a car using the same pattern.
Judge Higginbotham concluded that the order and sequence of the data
was an expressed idea. "[O]nly to the extent the expressions involve
stylistic creativity above and beyond the bare expression of sequence and
arrangement, should they be protected."
'6 9
The Synercom holding has been cited in defense of copyright in-
fringement on the basis that it provides authority that the non-literal
aspects of a program-the sequence, organization, and structure-are
merely expressed ideas, not copyrightable expression. In subsequent
cases, courts have generally not reached the same result as Judge Hig-
ginbotham. This may be largely explained by the fact that the 1978
Synercom decision preceded both CONTU's report to Congress and the
1980 amendment to the 1976 Copyright Act.
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc.70 was the first case to
determine that the structure, sequence and organization of a computer
program's audiovisual display is copyrightable. The plaintiff,
Broderbund Software, marketed a program called Print Shop for the
Apple computer. The defendant, Unison World, contacted Broderbund
to negotiate the rights that would allow Unison to adapt Print Shop to
run on the IBM/PC. Broderbund tentatively agreed to allow Unison to
convert Print Shop. Under the tentative agreement, Unison was re-
quired to produce an exact copy of Print Shop. Unison painstakingly
duplicated the interface of Print Shop. After Unison had copied a sub-
stantial portion of Print Shop, the parties were unable to reach a final
agreement, and terminated negotiations. Unison continued to develop
its own enhanced version of Print Shop for the IBM/PC called
Printmaster. Unison did not, however, rewrite the portions of
Printmaster that had already been copied from Print Shop. Broderbund
sued Unison for copyright infringement of the audiovisual portion of the
program.
The Broderbund court also analyzed the idea/expression dichotomy
67. Synercom, 452 F. Supp. at 1013.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1014 (emphasis in original).
70. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
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underlying the program. 7 1 The court found that the idea was the crea-
tion of greeting cards, banners, posters and signs, and everything else
was expression. 7 2 Unison argued that the idea and expression merged
such that any menu-driven computer program used to print greeting
cards, signs, banners, and posters would have a user interface substan-
tially similar to that of Print Shop. At trial, however, the plaintiff intro-
duced evidence of another printing program, Stickybear Printer, that
had a substantially different interface from Print Shop. Based upon the
Stickybear Printer program, the court concluded that the idea and ex-
pression had not merged.73  Unison also raised a variation on the
merger doctrine, the rules and instruction test.7 4 The rules and instruc-
tion test applies when there are a limited number of ways to express the
idea, and granting copyright protection to the expression would be tan-
tamount to protecting the idea or process itself. Again, the court relied
upon the Stickybear Print program to reject this argument. Based upon
the evidence, there was more than one way to express the idea.
Unison next argued, relying on Synercom, that the interface of a com-
puter program is not copyrightable. 75 The court, however, rejected
Synercom and found Whelan, which extended copyright protection to the
structure, sequence, and organization of the program's code, to be the
controlling authority. The court reasoned that in non-computer copy-
right cases, courts protect the non-literal aspects of a work, and that
computer programs should be afforded the same protection.76 The
court noted that Congress "intended sequencing and ordering to be
protectable in the appropriate circumstances.., and the computer field
is not an exception to this general rule." 77 Unison also raised the de-
fense that the audiovisual displays of the Print Shop program were not
eligible for copyright protection because they do not fall within the defi-
nition of "pictorial" or "graphic" works. 78 In response to this defense
the court ruled:
In the present case, it is clear that the structure, sequence,
and layout of the audiovisual displays in "Print Shop" were dic-
tated primarily by artistic and aesthetic considerations, and not
by utilitarian or mechanical ones .... The bottom line is that
the designer of any program that performed the same functions
as "Print Shop" had available a wide range of expression gov-
erned predominantly by artistic and not utilitarian
considerations.
79
Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone Distribution Corp. 8 0 is the final
71. Id. at 1131.
72. Id. at 1132.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1134.
75. Id. at 1132.
76. Id. at 1132-33.
77. Id. at 1133.
78. Id. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
79. 648 F. Supp. at 1134.
80. 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
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third generation case. Plaintiff, Digital, developed Crosstalk XVI, a tele-
communications program for personal computers. Crosstalk had a
unique "status screen" or "main menu" that made its telecommunica-
tions software easier to use than other programs. The defendant, Soft-
kione, decided to clone Crosstalk XVI and aptly called it Mirror. Digital
asserted that Softklone's copying of the Crosstalk XVI status screen in-
fringed Digital's copyright of both the status screen and the program.
The Digital court concluded that copyright protection of a computer
program does not extend to screen displays generated by the program
and that "copying of a program's screen displays, without evidence of
copying of the program's source code, object code, sequence, organiza-
tion or structure, does not state a claim of infringement. ''si Since Digi-
tal claimed a separate copyright for the Crosstalk XVI main menu, the
court next considered whether that copyright had been infringed. Soft-
klone contended that the status screen was "not copyrightable because
it is a necessary expression of the idea underlying the status screen and/
or because it is simply a 'blank form.' ",82 The court concluded that the
"idea" behind the Crosstalk XVI status screen was the process or man-
ner by which the status screen operated, and the "expression" was the
method by which the idea was communicated to the user.88
The court noted that certain aspects of the status screen were ideas
that could not be copyrighted. The "idea" underlying the status screen
was a two symbol command-driven menu with the changes reflected on
a screen listing the computer program's commands. All of these ele-
ments related to how the program received commands from the user
and how the program reflected the results on the screen, and were thus
ideas. Certain aspects of the status screen were, however, unrelated to
how the program operated and were "expression." The arrangement of
the commands, the sequence for entering the command, and highlight-
ing and capitalizing two letters of the command terms had no relation to
how the program operated, and thus were protected expression.8 4
Softklone, also relying upon Synercom, contended that the Crosstalk
81. Id. at 456. The court based this finding upon its conclusion that:
screen displays generated by computer programs are not direct "copies" or "re-
productions" of the literary or substantive content of the computer programs.
This distinction results from the fact that the same screen can be created by a
variety of separate and independent computer programs. It is somewhat illogical
to conclude that a screen can be a "copy" of many different programs.
Id. at 455-456.
The court also based its finding upon the conclusions reached in Whelan, Inc. v.Jas-
low Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987):
While finding that copying of a program's screen displays may serve as indi-
rect evidence of copying of a program, the Whelan court did not specifically ex-
tend a computer program's copyright protection to its screen displays. The
Whelan court cited approvingly those cases which have found a computer pro-
gram's screen displays, at least in the context of "video games," to be separately
copyrightable as "audiovisual works."
Digital Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distribution Corp., 659 F. Supp 449
(N.D. Ga. 1987) (citations omitted).
82. Digztal, 659 F. Supp. at 457.
83. Id. at 458.
84. Id. at 459.
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XVI status screen is a necessary expression of the idea it expresses and
therefore is expression merged with idea.8 5 Digital concluded that the
difference between Synercom and the instant case was that in Synercom the
sequence of the data input into the computer was relevant to the func-
tioning of the Synercom computer program. The defendant in Synercom
duplicated the sequence within its "source code" but did not create for-
mat cards with the same headings and shaded areas. On the other hand,
Softklone's arrangement of the status screen had no relationship to the
functioning of the computer program.8 6 The arrangement of the status
screen in Crosstalk XVI involved "stylistic creativity and authorship
above and beyond the ideas embodied in the status screen." T8 7 The
commands and techniques used in Mirror could have been arranged and
delineated in an infinite number of ways that would have been different
from Crosstalk. The modes of expression chosen by the plaintiff for its
status screen are not necessary to the "idea." The plaintiff's expression
of the status screen, therefore, did not merge with the idea of the status
screen.
88
Softklone's last argument was that the status screen was analogous
to a "blank form" and that blank forms which do not convey information
or contain original pictorial expression are not copyrightable. 89 The
court concluded, however, that in the instant case "the status screen,
even if found to be a 'form,' clearly expresses and conveys information
and, therefore, is copyrightable." 90
The three cases discussed in this section, Synercom, Broderbund, and
Digital, illustrate that the courts are not in agreement on the scope of the
protection for the structure, sequence, and organization of the non-lit-
eral aspect of a computer program. Synercom impliedly determined that
the structure, sequence, and organization of data input formats are not
subject to protection. Both Digital and Broderbund declined to follow
Synercom's lead, and instead found that the program's interface-its
method of communicating and accepting data to and from a user-is
protected expression, but for different reasons. The uncertainty created
by the ad hoc nature of the software cases has hampered the develop-
ment and progression of the computer software field. Software develop-
ers have no adequate guidelines regarding what level of independent
development is required to avoid copyright infringement. 9 1 In Lotus De-
velopment Corp. v. Paperback Software International, discussed in the next
section, Judge Keeton attempted to distill all the previous cases con-
cerning copyright protection of non-literal elements, particularly related
to computer software, and define the scope of the Copyright Act as it
applies to the non-literal aspects of a computer program.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 460.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 461.
90. Id. at 462.
91. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A] (1990).
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IV. LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V PAPERBACK SOFTWARE
INTERNATIONAL
9 2
In Lotus, the court was asked to determine two critical issues: "(1)
whether and to what extent plaintiff's computer spreadsheet program,
Lotus 1-2-3, is copyrightable, [and] (2) whether defendants' VP-Planner
[a competing spreadsheet program] was, on undisputable facts, an in-
fringing work containing elements substantially similar to copyrightable
elements of 1-2-3." 93 It was generally not disputed in Lotus "that literal
manifestations of a computer program-including both source code and
object code-if original, are copyrightable."'94 The central issue in Lotus
was whether, and to what degree, non-literal elements of a computer
program, in particular the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface, are copyrightable.
Central to the court's decision was whether non-literal elements (includ-
ing the overall organization of a program, the structure of a program's
command system, and the presentation of information on the screen)
were copyrightable, and if so, how the non-literal elements that are
copyrightable could be identified.
95
The Lotus court developed its own three-step test to determine
copyrightability of the non-literal elements of computer software. Ini-
tially, the underlying idea of the work must be identified. Next, individ-
ual elements of expression which comprise the work must be evaluated
to determine whether each expression is limited to the functional re-
quirements of the work or is in the public domain, or whether, con-
versely, it constitutes an original expression. Finally, to determine
copyrightability of the work, it must be determined whether any of the
elements not determined to be limited to the functional requirements of
the work or in the public domain constitute a substantial part of the
work.
9 6
The first step in the Lotus test is essentially a restatement of the ab-
stractions test first expressed by Judge Learned Hand in Nichols v. Uni-
versal Pictures Corp.9 7 The Lotus court noted that, at the most general
92. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
93. Id. at 42.
94. Id. at 45.
95. Id. at 46.
96. FIRST, in making the determination of 'copyrightability,' the decisionmaker
must focus upon alternatives that counsel may suggest, or the court may con-
ceive, along the scale from the most generalized conception to the most particu-
larized, and choose some formulation-some conception or definition of the
'idea'-for the purpose of distinguishing between the idea and its expression.
SECOND, the decisionmaker must focus upon whether an alleged expression
of the idea is limited to elements essential to expression of that idea (or is one of
only a few ways of expressing the idea) or instead includes identifiable elements
of expression not essential to every expression of that idea.
THIRD, having identified elements of expression not essential to every ex-
pression of the idea, the decisionmaker must focus on whether those elements are
a substantial part of the allegedly copyrightable 'work.'
Id. at 60-61.
97. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
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level, the idea of an electronic spreadsheet is not copyrightable. 98 Thus,
considered at the most general level, the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface, like
a blank form, is also not copyrightable. "[I]f a particular expression of
the idea of an electronic spreadsheet communicates no details beyond
those essential to stating the idea itself, then that expression would not
be copyrightable." 99 A simple diagram illustrates this analysis:




I (E.g., Lotus 1-2-3
Menu Command Structure)
Expression
The key to determining whether the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface is
copyrightable is found in the Lotus court's use of the idea/expression
dichotomy as the second step in its test. "The issue here is whether
Lotus 1-2-3 does go beyond those details essential to any expression of
the idea, and includes substantial elements of expression, distinctive and
original, which are thus copyrightable." 10 0
Over the years, the question as to whether an expression is distinc-
tive and original has been determined on a sliding scale. Expressions
that were once considered original have entered into the public domain
and are now considered essential to the operation of computer pro-
grams. Likewise, expressions that today are considered original and
non-functional may someday be considered an essential element of a
standard interface. For example, the following graph illustrates the pro-
gression of the "Esc" key (the standard key to "undo" or back out of an
98. At the most general level of Hand's abstractions scale, Nichols, 45 F.2d at
121-the computer programs at issue in this case, and other computer programs
that have been considered during the course of trial, are expressions of the idea
of a computer program for an electronic spreadsheet. Defendants are quite cor-
rect, then, in asserting that the idea of developing an electronic spreadsheet is not
copyrightable-that the core idea of such a spreadsheet is both functional and
obvious, even to computer users who claim no technical competence.




DENVER UNIVERSITY LI W REVIEW
operation) and the "F I" key (the standard key to invoke on-screen help)







The Lotus 1-2-3 user interface was described by the plaintiffs as in-
cluding "such elements as 'the menus (and their structure and organiza-
tion), the long prompts, the screens on which they appear, the function
key assignments, [and] the macro commands and language' . . . .,o
The court determined that, with the exception of the menu command
structure, all of the identified elements of expression within the Lotus 1-
2-3 user interface merged with the idea of an electronic spreadsheet
(i.e., each is an essential element present in most if not all expressions of
an electronic spreadsheet).1 0 2 The Lotus court specifically found that
"[ain example of distinctive details of expression is the precise 'struc-
ture, sequence, and organization' of the menu command system.' 0 3
Since the Lotus court did identify an expression within the Lotus 1-
2-3 user interface that was original and did not merge with the underly-
101. Id. at 63 (quoting Plaintiff's Post-Trial Brief at 53).
102. The macro command structure was deemed to be dependent upon the menu com-
mand structure. Id. at 66-67.
103. Id. at 67 (citation omitted).
This particular expression of a menu structure is not essential to the elec-
tronic spreadsheet idea, nor does it merge with the somewhat less abstract idea of
a menu structure for an electronic spreadsheet. The idea of a menu structure-
including the overall structure, the order of commands in each menu line, the
choice of letters, words, or "symbolic tokens" to represent each command, the
presentation of these symbolic tokens on the screen (i.e., first letter only, abbrevi-
ations, full words, full words with one or more letters capitalized or underlined),
the type of menu system used (i.e., one-, two-, or three-line moving-cursor
menus, pull-down 'menus, or command-driven interfaces), and the long
prompts-could be expressed in a great many if not literally unlimited number of
ways.
[Vol. 68:2
PROPOSED LEGAL ADVISOR ROADMAP
ing idea of an electronic spreadsheet, the final step in establishing the
copyrightability of the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface was accomplished by
the court's determination that this particular expression is a substantial
part of the user interface. 10 4 In general, therefore, the more copying of
substantial elements which are expressions subject to protection, the
greater the likelihood of a finding of copyright violation. This analysis












The test developed by the Lotus court is an attempt to differentiate
between copyrightability and copying. Under the Lotus test, copyright-
ability is first determined before copying is considered.' 0 5 The abstrac-
tions test and the idea/expression dichotomy, from which the first two
steps of the Lotus test are derived, have traditionally been applied to de-
termine whether the copying that exists is permissible.
The traditional abstractions test questions whether the defendant
has copied so much of the non-literal elements of the plaintiff's work so
as to go beyond using the basic underlying idea. The Lotus test requires
the court to first determine whether the plaintiff's work, taken alone, is
no more than an idea or an expression of that idea. The traditional
idea/expression dichotomy is concerned with whether the defendant
copied portions of the non-literal elements of the plaintiff's work be-
cause those particular elements of expression were the only practical ex-
pressions available. The Lotus test determines whether the plaintiff's
selection of expression was dictated by functional requirements or in-
dependent, distinctive expression.
Finally, both the traditional approaches were used to determine
104. Id. at 68.
105. Id. at 42.
1991] 209
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
substantial similarity (i.e., did the defendant impermissibly copy a sub-
stantial portion of the plaintiff's work). As Judge Hand stated when first
discussing levels of abstraction, the "question is whether the part so
taken is 'substantial,' and therefore not a 'fair use' of the copyrighted
work."1
0 6
Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc. 10 7 offers another
example of the traditional manner in which courts consider infringe-
ment of non-literal elements. In discussing the application of the idea/
expression dichotomy, the Concrete court stated that it:
first must determine whether there has been "copying." This
step involves "dissection" of the work, perhaps aided by expert
testimony, to assess whether there are sufficient articulable sim-
ilarities to justify a finding that the defendant has copied from
the protected work.... Second, once "copying" is established,
the court must determine whether the copying is sufficiently
substantial to constitute "unlawful appropriation" ("illicit
copying"). That is, copying only trivial aspects of another's work will
not result in substantial similarity; it is only when the copying is
sufficiently extensive that infringement occurs.108
Under the Lotus test, however, substantiality is initially an element
of copyrightability; the third step of the Lotus test is whether any ele-
ments which pass the first two steps constitute a substantial part of the
work. Although the Lotus court essentially applied existing tests of in-
fringement of non-literal elements, it is questionable whether the appli-
cation of its own test in this particular case is accurate. The critical
factor is whether the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command structure is an original
and non-obvious manner of expression. While a menu command struc-
ture for an electronic spreadsheet can be expressed in a variety of ways,
the court specifically noted that "some of [the] specific command terms
[in the Lotus 1-2-3 menu system] are quite obvious or merge with the
idea of such a particular command term."' 09
The court further noted that "[m]ost of the submenus ... present a
list of up to about ten full-word menu choices, presented in order of pre-
dicted frequency of use rather than alphabetically." 10 The court nevertheless
concluded that the Lotus 1-2-3 "menu structure, taken as a whole-in-
cluding the choice of command terms, the structure and order of those
terms, their presentation on the screen, and the long prompts-is an
aspect of 1-2-3 that.., meets the requirements of the second element of
the [Lotus court's] legal test for copyrightability.""11 It is interesting
that the Lotus court first broke down the whole Lotus 1-2-3 user interface
into separate components and then considered the individual compo-
nents as a whole.
106. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
107. 843 F.2d 600 (1st Cir. 1988).
108. Id. at 608 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
109. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 67.
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 68.
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In deciding whether the menu command structure is a substantial
part of the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface-the only element of the Lotus 1-
2-3 user interface determined to be subject to protection-the Lotus
court merely stated:
The user interface of 1-2-3 is its most unique element, and is
the aspect that has made 1-2-3 so popular. That defendants
went to such trouble to copy that element is a testament of its
substantiality. Accordingly, evaluation of the third element of
the legal test weighs heavily in favor of Lotus. 12
Despite the fact that the Lotus court viewed the Lotus 1-2-3 menu com-
mand structure, taken as a whole, to be subject matter ripe for protec-
tion, the court rejected using a "look and feel" analysis which rests upon
considering a work as a whole. The Lotus court specifically rejected the
"look and feel" analysis because it is conclusory, indicating that courts
have "used the concept, not in determining copyrightability, but, appar-
ently assuming copyrightability, in applying the substantial similarity
test to determine whether forbidden copying had occurred."'
15
The Lotus determination that the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command struc-
ture is a substantial part of that user interface appears, itself, to be con-
clusory. The only support provided for the premise that the menu
command structure made Lotus 1-2-3 "so popular" is the fact that the
defendants attempted to copy it. Even this conclusion loses some of its
support by the court's own later statements.' 
14
Once the Lotus court determined that the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface
is copyrightable subject matter, it then turned to actual copying by the
defendants. Based upon a reading of the court's decision, establishment
of infringement can be interpreted two ways: (1) defendants' user inter-
face, taken as a whole, is substantially similar to plaintiff's user interface,
taken as a whole; or (2) defendants' menu command structure, taken as
a whole, is substantially similar to plaintiff's menu command structure,
taken as a whole.
In support of the first interpretation, the Lotus court specifically
found that, based upon its three-step test, "copyrightability of the user
interface of 1-2-3 is established." '1 15 When determining whether there
had been copying by the defendants, the court first noted general dis-
similarities between the two works, such as the organization of help
screens, the greater width of the VP-Planner screen, and the ability of
112. Id.
113. Id. at 63.
114. Regarding the defendants' decision that the Lotus 1-2-3 command structure had
to be copied in order to ensure the popularity of VP-Planner, the court stated that "[t]o
some degree at least, defendants' premises have proved incorrect in hindsight." Id. at 69.
If the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command structure's substantiality is based upon it being the
most unique element of the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface and that which made 1-2-3 so popu-
lar, as evidenced by the defendants' desire to copy it, if that desire is misplaced, is that not evi-
dence that the menu command structure is not quite so substantial after all. As the court
also stated, Excel (a competing electronic spreadsheet) achieved commercial success with-
out copying the Lotus 1-2-3 command structure. Id.
115. Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
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VP-Planner to hide certain columns."l 6 The court then determined that
the "works are, nevertheless, substantially, indeed, strikingly, simi-
lar." 117 In support of the second interpretation, the Lotus court dwelled
on the similarities between the two works' menu command structure:
"The court's comparison of the 1-2-3 menu command hierarchy and the
VP-Planner menu hierarchy confirms that VP-Planner 'has the same
command tree' as 1-2-3-that is, that defendants copied the expression
embodied in the 1-2-3 menu hierarchy.""18 The court also noted that
"defendants . . . have admitted that they copied these elements of pro-
tected expression." ' 19
It is unclear which "elements of protected expression" the defend-
ants copied: the elements of expression, including the source and ob-
ject codes (contained within the whole of Lotus 1-2-3 which constitute
the user interface) or the elements of expression within the Lotus 1-2-3
user interface, namely the menu command structure (which the court
determined to be subject to protection). The court concluded its discus-
sion of the defendants' copying by phrasing the issue as
Does [defendants' product] have significant features that are
substantially similar [to Lotus 1-2-3]? ... The answer to this
question must be "yes."
Accordingly, I conclude that it is indisputable that defend-
ants have copied substantial copyrightable elements of plaintiff's
copyrighted work.
120
This again begs the question: Which copyrightable elements of Lotus 1-
2-3 were defendants guilty of copying-the user interface, taken as a
whole, or the menu command structure? If the latter, and had defend-
ants not copied the menu command structure, but copied the remaining
substantial, non-protected, elements of the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface,
would they have been guilty of infringement?
Another statement by the court implies that it was focusing on the
defendants' copying of the menu command structure:
Moreover, even if some elements of VP-Planner were very
different, it would not give defendants a license to copy other
substantial elements of 1-2-3 verbatim. If one publishes a
1,000-page book of which only a 10-page segment is an unau-
thorized reproduction of copyrighted material, and if the 10-
page segment is a qualitatively substantial part of the copy-
righted work, it is not a defense to a claim of infringement that
the book is 99% different from the copyrighted material. Thus,
116. Id. at 70.
117. Id. In support of its conclusion of substantial similarity despite some differences,
the court notes: "[A] laundry list of specific differences ... will not preclude a finding of
infringement where the works are substantially similar in other respects .... When ana-
lyzing two works to determine whether they are substantially similar, courts should be
careful not to lose sight of the forest for the trees." Id. (quoting Atari v. North Amer.
Phillips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 618 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880
(1982)).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 68.
120. Id. at 70 (emphasis added).
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defendants' proof that VP-Planner has many features that are
different from Lotus 1-2-3 is off point.
121
By the court's holding that the defendants' copying of a "qualita-
tively substantial part" (the menu command structure of Lotus 1-2-3)
was enough to constitute infringement, it could be implied from Lotus
that if the menu command structure had not been copied, but every
other non-literal element within Lotus 1-2-3 had been, then no infringe-
ment would have been found. 122 Such a conclusion is reasonable if it
were determined that the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command structure was
such a unique and distinctive part of Lotus 1-2-3 that, on its own, it
represented to the lay observer the Lotus 1-2-3 product. Very little evi-
dence was presented in the Lotus opinion to support the "substantiality"
of the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command structure.
As noted previously, the Lotus court specifically rejects applying the
"look and feel" analysis developed in Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card
Co. 123 In Lotus, the court created a more restrictive test by requiring that
not only must an element subject to protection be found within the non-
literal elements, but it also must be a substantial element. The Lotus
court may have been mindful of the strong dissent in Roth which stated:
I cannot... follow the logic of the majority in holding that
the uncopyrightable words and the imitated, but not copied art
work, constitutes such total composition as to be subject to
protection under the copyright laws. The majority concludes
that in the overall arrangement of the text, the art work and the
association of the art work to the text, the cards were copyright-
able and the copyright infringed. This conclusion, as I view it,
results in the whole becoming substantially greater than the
sum total of its parts. 124
121. Id. (citations omitted).
122. There is case law which supports a finding that copying even relatively minuscule
parts of a copyrighted work can constitute infringement. In Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Kamar Indus., Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1162 (S.D. Tex. 1982), the court held that exact
copying of two lines from a movie could constitute infringement. In this case the defend-
ant began to promote and market certain merchandise, such as drinking mugs and pencil
holders, bearing prominent inscriptions in the form of"I E.T." and "E.T. Phone Homel!"
In finding infringement of the plaintiff's copyrighted movie, the court stated:
The character "E.T." is a central component of [the movie] "E.T. The Extra-
Terrestrial." "E.T." is a unique and distinctive character about whom the movie
revolves. Plaintiffs contend, and the Court believes, that "E.T." is more than a
mere vehicle for telling the story and that "E.T." actually constitutes the story
being told. The name "E.T." itself is highly distinctive and is inseparable from
the identity of the character. The use of the name "E.T." on Kamar's products
inevitably conjures up the image and appeal of the "E.T." character. The Court
finds that the average lay observer would recognize readily the "E.T." name as
used on Kamar's products as having been taken from the central character of
Universal's copyrighted motion picture. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact
that the name "E.T." appears on Kamar's products in conjunction with actual
lines of dialogue from the movie, and that it is displayed on at least one of
Kamar's products in a distinctive style and format similar to that used in connec-
tion with Universal's movie.
Universal, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1165.
123. 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970). Roth found plaintiff's greeting cards eligible for
copyright, even though they were comprised of non-copyrightable elements. Id. at 1109.
124. Id. at 1111.
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There is, however, a strong line of authority which provides copy-
right protection, under the theory of compilation, to the non-literal ele-
ments of a work, even though that work is comprised of non-protectable
components. 125 Indeed, the Lotus court noted that the statutory provi-
sions regarding compilation, while not essential to its analysis under its
legal test, did reinforce it. 126 A very important element of granting
copyright protection to a work which is composed of non-copyrightable
elements is the degree of protection granted to that work.' 27 Where
the computer program in question is utilitarian in nature (such as an
electronic spreadsheet) as opposed to fictional (such as a computer
game), it is logical to conclude that its user interface is more of a "fac-
tual" work. This approach, indirectly supported by Lotus, would require
essentially a verbatim appropriation of the plaintiff's work before in-
fringement could be found. Since the Lotus court found a number of
dissimilarities between the two computer programs, verbatim copying
could not be established. This may be the reason for the Lotus court
using a test which avoided the ability to establish copyrightability with-
out at least a substantial protectable element.
Despite the difficulties contained within the Lotus decision, it still
reaches the correct result for the particular facts at hand, if only for pub-
lic policy reasons. In Lotus, the defendants raised a public policy argu-
ment that the need to achieve standardization and compatibility within
the computer software industry should preclude a finding of copyright-
ability of the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface.' 28 While certain aspects of a
computer program's user interface may or may not constitute substan-
tial elements of the work taken as a whole, user interface design is im-
portant. Enhancing the user's productivity through better user interface
design incorporates the sciences of anatomy, physiology, and psychol-
125. See Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197, 204-05 (9th Cir.
1989) for a summary of cases which hold that a copyrightable compilation can consist
mainly or entirely of uncopyrightable elements.
126. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 67 (noting 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103).
127. One consequence of the policy in favor of free use of ideas is that the degree
of substantial similarity required to show infringement varies according to the
type of work and the ideas expressed in it. Some ideas can be expressed in myr-
iad ways, while others allow only a narrow range of expression. Fictional works
generally fall into the first category. The basic idea of a fictional work might be
that classic, boy meets girl. This idea can be expressed, as it has been through
thousands of years of literature, with infinite variations in setting, sequence of
incident, and characterization. An author wishing to write yet another work using
the "boy meets girl" idea can choose from a wide range of materials in compos-
ing his or her own expression of the idea. Therefore a new work incorporating
that idea need not be a verbatim copy or close paraphrase of an earlier work to
infringe that work. A resemblance in details of setting, incident, or characteriza-
tion that falls short of close paraphrase may be enough to establish substantial
similarity and infringement....
Factual works are different. Subsequent authors wishing to express the ideas
contained in a factual work often can choose from only a narrow range of expres-
sion .... Therefore, similarity of expression may have to amount to verbatim
reproduction or very close paraphrasing before a factual work will be deemed
infringed.
Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th Cir. 1984)
(citations omitted).
128. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 71.
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ogy. 129 Judge Keeton acknowledged this when he noted the menu-
choice commands in the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface were "presented in
order of predicted frequency of use rather than alphabetically."'13 0
Commentators within the computer industry have been promoting
standardization and compatibility since the first microcomputers were
introduced. Attempts to standardize have been driven by user demands
to allow different programs to share a common user interface, forming
the basis for open systems that share many common attributes, commu-
nication protocols, and data formats so that users can "easily intercon-
nect different computers and programs and avoid learning a multitude
of user interfaces." 3
1
Finally, the cost of learning a software package is substan-
tial. During the early use of a new software package, a user
spends considerable time hunting for advice and correcting
mistakes. The anticipation of interface angst has inhibited
many potential users from employing new software applica-
tions that would increase productivity. Even those who take the
time to learn to use a software package may choose to master
only a small number of its functions.'
3 2
The Lotus court referred to the defendants' standardization argu-
ment as the "OTSOG (on the shoulders of giants) Principle": innova-
tion in computer programming is advanced as each programmer builds
upon the ideas of previous programmers.133 The fallacy of defendants'
contention is that they specifically discarded any innovations in their
own product in order to become a "workalike of 1-2-3."'3 4 Defendants
were standing on the shoulders of Lotus not to see further, but to steal
market share. Their goal was not to create a new and better electronic
spreadsheet but to produce a cheaper Lotus 1-2-3. In this respect, the
defendants fit the classic role of "mudball."
129. Curtis, Engineering Computer "Look and Feel" User Interface Technology and Human Fac-
tors Engineering, 30 JURIMEMICS J. 51, 63 (Fall 1989).
130. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 68.
131. Curtis, supra at note 129.
132. Id.
133. Defendants' general contention-that "Progress of Science and useful Arts"
cannot occur unless authors and inventors are privileged to build upon earlier
progress and earlier innovation-has long been a virtually unchallenged premise
in all branches of the law of intellectual property. An early expression of the
point is Newton's declaration: "If I have seen further it is by standing on ye
sholders of Giants." Sir Isaac Newton, Letter to Robert Hooke, February 5,
1675/1676, quoted in R. Merton, On the Shoulders of Giants: A Shandean Postscript 31
(1965).
Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 77. See also Id. n.3.
134. It is incontrovertible that, in the process [of making VP-Planner compatible
with Lotus 1-2-3, defendants] ... copied the expressive elements of 1-2-3 that the
court has concluded are copyrightable:
[M]aking the changes required for macro compatibility meant that we had to
revise existing elements of the [VP-Planner] spreadsheet interface, including the
hierarchical menu structure; ensure that keystroke sequences would bring about
the same operational result in both programs; add certain functional elements
found in Lotus 1-2-3 which VP-Planner did not yet support; and discard certain
features which, although beneficial, were inconsistent with the macro compatibility requirement.
Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
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While the intent of the infringing party is not a factor in determin-
ing liability,13 5 it may be indirectly relevant if it impacts the underlying
policy reasons for copyright protection. No one should be rewarded for
rejecting new and beneficial creations in order to exploit another's ex-
penditure of time, money, and effort to create an original expression.
Any other finding would be in direct contradiction to the policies under-
lying copyright protection.
While the holding in Lotus may reach the correct results for the facts
of that particular case, there is concern that the legal test developed in
Lotus, when applied to a different set of facts, will lead to an incorrect
result. Of particular concern is the pending legal actions between Lotus
Development Corporation and Borland International, Inc. Borland pro-
duces a competing electronic spreadsheet (Quattro Pro) which many
critics consider to be superior to Lotus 1-2-3.136 There is no question,
overall, that Quattro Pro's user interface is substantially different from
the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface, except in one respect. The Borland
product can be executed in a "Lotus 1-2-3 emulation mode," that is, by
specifying a particular command the Borland spreadsheet incorporates
the Lotus 1-2-3 menu structure into its own. "Because [Lotus] 1-2-3 is
the de facto standard for spreadsheets, any company hoping to achieve
significant success must be compatible with it.
1 3 7
Since the Lotus court determined that the Lotus 1-2-3 menu com-
mand structure is a substantial, protectable part of the Lotus 1-2-3 user
interface, there is concern that Quattro Pro, just like VP-Planner, may be
found to infringe Lotus 1-2-3. Quattro Pro, however, unlike VP-Plan-
ner, was never written to be a "workalike of 1-2-3." This issue is com-
pounded by the fact that the Lotus-compatible menus in Quattro Pro do
not even look like the Lotus originals and may even be considered
superior. 138
Lotus only partially addressed this issue. Just as Broderbund
Software used a third party's computer program to establish that an un-
derlying idea can be expressed in different ways, Lotus used Microsoft's
Excel product to demonstrate a unique user interface for an electronic
spreadsheet. The Lotus court noted that Excel contained a macro con-
version program to convert Lotus 1-2-3 macros to Excel-executable
macros, establishing that complete menu compatibility was not required
for Lotus 1-2-3 macros to function within a competing product.13 9 The
court also indicated that VP-Planner would not have infringed if it had
provided an on-line help function that would show users the VP-Planner
135. See generally 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.08 (1990).
136. New York Times, July 22, 1990, at F4, col. 1. See generally Seymour, Victory Spurs
Lotus to Take-No-Prisoners Campaign, PC WEEK, July 16, 1990, at 12.
137. New York Times, supra note 136 at F4, col. 1.
138. "Instead of wandering through a wilderness of one-line menu options with no
sign of where you've been, Quattro delivers drop-down windows and daughter windows,
and, when necessary, more daughter windows.
You can easily trace the command sequence you've typed-something that eludes
(and frustrates) many Lotus users." Seymour, supra note 136 at 12.
139. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 69.
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equivalent for 1-2-3 commands, as Excel also does.1 40
What the Lotus court did not address is how far one can help a user
transfer 1-2-3 commands to a competing spreadsheet. Excel does so by
having the user type in the sequence of keystrokes that would execute
the command were Lotus 1-2-3 being used. Excel then interprets the 1-
2-3 commands and presents a screen to the user with instructions on
how to execute the same command in Excel. The Lotus decision gave no
indication of where a software developer may cross the line of infringe-
ment in assisting users to adjust from Lotus 1-2-3 to a new product.
Lotus tells us Microsoft's approach is permitted; Borland's approach may
not be. What we do not know is whether an approach in the middle,
such as having the user type in the Lotus 1-2-3 command keystrokes and
then having the program automatically execute them (without showing
the user a Lotus 1-2-3 menu), is permissible. This dilemma can be











141. Microsoft's recently released Excel Version 3.0 actually goes one step further by
providing users with the ability to turn on a "Help for Lotus 1-2-3 Users" option which
gives users the ability to "watch Microsoft Excel demonstrate ... equivalent procedure[s]
for the Lotus 1-2-3 command (specified]." MICROSoFr GUIDE: USING HELP FOR Lorus 1-
2-3 USERS at 4. When this option is activated (by pressing the "/" (slash) key), Excel lists
the Lotus 1-2-3 main menu commands in order of their appearance in Lotus 1-2-3 (though
in a column rather than a single row), with submenu commands listed for the particular
main menu command highlighted.
The submenu commands are listed in a single row toward the bottom of the screen
and change as different main menu commands are highlighted. Excel Version 3.0 users
can then select Lotus 1-2-3 commands by pressing the first letter of each command (as in
Lotus 1-2-3). Once the commands have been selected, Excel activates its own commands
to execute the selected procedure (demonstrating to the user how the particular
procedure is executed under Excel), and then executes the selected procedure. In this
way, users of Excel Version 3.0 are able to have the entire Lotus 1-2-3 menu structure
displayed (though in a slightly different visual representation), can select Lotus 1-2-3
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While the Lotus decision promotes public policy by preventing a
software developer from marketing a product which was designed solely
to siphon off market share and not to compete because it offered better
tools and options, this decision has the potential of having the com-
pletely opposite effect when applied to different circumstances.
V. ANALYSIS OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT CASES
The table of cases provided in this section is based on an extensive
selection of cases in which the scope of software copyright protection
was a major issue. The authors also analyzed several cases in which the
issue of software copyrights was a side issue. These less important cases
are noted in a footnote to the table of cases. The analysis of this exten-
sive number of cases has resulted in several observations concerning
how an attorney can best advise a software developer to avoid copyright
infringement when creating new software products.
Each column was chosen for specific reasons. Naturally, the date,
consisting of month and year, was a logical starting point as well as the
case name and level of court. The "winners circle" was used to identify
the true winner, which at times could be either plaintiff or defendant,
given the procedural posturing of the case. The "stage of the proceed-
ing" is the next column, and aids in the analysis due to the different
burdens of proof. The "type of software" is presented next to show
whether the disputes occur over operating system or application
software. The critical issues are always questions of fact, and thus the
trier of fact has enormous discretion in these cases.
A column indicating the economic relationship between the parties,
and whether the relationship was breached, is provided to aid in analyz-
ing any equity concerns. Following this column, "access" is of course
needed for all copyright infringement cases, followed by "reasons for
copying." Reasons for copying aids in understanding the alleged in-
fringer's rationale for any copying. The amount of work the alleged in-
fringer did and the degree of copying are included due to the subtle
influence equitable considerations undoubtedly have on the trier of fact.
The "legal conclusions" column assists in showing the development of
various legal theories. The "precedent column" is last, and helps show
how the cases have become interrelated over time.
menu options in an identical manner as though in Lotus 1-2-3, and can then have those
commands executed in Excel.
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DATE CE NAIIE LEVEL OF STAGE OF WINXnt'S Tsi'e OF EcoNoMIC RELATIONSHIP/ ACCESS To
COURT PRocEDmG CmcLE SorsWAR BREAcH oF DuTY SOFTWARE
Copic
8/78 Synercom v. Univ. Computing Dist. Trial No Application D Developed S1W pgm that n/a
462 F. Supp. 1003 N.D.T infringement Input Formats utilized P's data input card
by D formats- Prior Economic
Relationship/No Breach
5/80 Data Cash %. JS&A Group App. Summary No Application No Economic Relationship/ Same628 F,2d 103$ 7th Cir. Judgmsent infingement Chess Game No Breadh ROM Chip
by D acq. from
Same
manuf.
1/82 Stem Elec. v. Kaufman App. Preliminary P's valid C/R App Game No Economic Relationship/ Access to
669 F.2d 852 2nd Cit. Injunction was infringed No Breach ame User
Interface
5/82 Willams v. Artic App, Injunctive P's valid C/R App-game No Economic Relationship! Yes
685 F.2d 870 3d Cir. Order was infringed Op- No Breach
Audiovisual
9/82 GCA v. Chance Dist. Preliminary IP's valid C/R App/ Former Employees/Breach of Yes
217 USPQ718 N.D. Calif. Injunction was infringed Diagnostic Confidence
operating Sys
2/83 Hubco Data v. Mgmit Assis DistL TRO & D's valid Operating Sys No Economic Relationship/ Yes
219 USPQ450 D Idaho Prelim C/K was Utility Breach of Licensing
Injunction infringed Agreement
8/83 Apple v. Franklin App. Preliminary P's valid C/R Operating sys No Economic Relationship/ Yes
714 F.2d 1240 3rd Circuit Injunction was infringed No Breach
2/84 Apple %. Formula App. Preliminary P's valid C/R Operating Sys No Economic Relationship/ Yes
725 F.2d 521 9th Cir. Injunction was infringed No Breach
3/85 SAS v. S&H Dist. Trial P's valid C/P Application D was Licensee of P/ Yes
605 F. Supp. 816 M.D. Tenn was infringed Stat. Analysis Breached
9/85 Williams v. Arndt Dist. Trial P's vAid C/R Application P & D under Contract/ Yes
626 F. Supp, 571 D. Mass was infringed Market Breached
Trading
12/85 Q-CO Ind. v. Hoffman Dist. Preliminary No Application D was Employee of P/ Yes
625 F. Supp. 608 S.D.N.Y. Injunction infringement Teleprompter No Breach
by D
1/86 K amer Mfg. ,. Andrews App. Trial P's valid C/R Application D was distributor of P/ Yes
783 F.2d 421 4th Cr. was infringed Game Breach of distribution
arrangement
8/86 Whelan s.Jaslow App. Injunctive P's valid C/R Application D hired P to write pgm to Yes
797 F.2d 1222 3rd Cir. Order was infringed Dental lab manage dental labs. C/R
S/W eventually vests in P. D
breached relationship and
translated pgm to another
computer language
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REASON FOR COPMING AMovr oF DEGREE OF LEGAL CoNcLusIoNs PutcEDirwr
WoR INFRINGER CoMING
DiD
Competitor indeterminable Input formats If order and sequence of data is
expression. then it's copyrightable
Competitor None Total S/W C/R exists in ROM but C/R
owuer must have C/R notice on
chip. Pre-Berne Cotoention
Competitor Minimal Total copy of Repetitive sequence of images is William v. Attic;
game user C/R -Pa)ers interaction with game Atari s. Amusemsent World;
interface doesn't make pgm not fixed Midway v. Driksthneider
Competitor Minimal Total Fixation of S/W in ROM Chip Data Cash v.jS&A Group;
occured; C/R protection Permitted Sten s. Kaufman;




Competitor Minimal Total P distribution was limited, thus no Tandy v. Pet Micro;
C/R notice required Data Cash v.JS&A Group;
"iofft v. McDonald's
Copied D's S/W to Upgrade Min to upgrade Total Was the copying of an idea or an Krofft v. McDonald's;
P's Computer expression? Must have subst. Williams v. Attic;
stimilarity of idea and expression Apple v. Franklin;
Tandy v. Pets Micro
To make D's operating system Minimal Total Pgms on ROM Chips are C/R. No Willams . Artic,
compatible with P's operating Distinction between source, object Midway v. Strohson.
System software and firm ware Data Cash v.JS&A Group;
GCA v. Chance,
Tandy v. Pets Micro;
_Apple v. Formula
To make D's operating system Minimal Total No distinction between source, Williams v. Antic
compatible with P's operating object and firm ware Krofft ,. McDonald's,
system software Apples. Franklin.
Atari v N.Aser, Phillips
D wanted to migrate P's S/W Some Copied S/W Pgm deieloped by D was denvatne Midway v. Attic
to a new platform from one work Apple %. Franklin;
platform to Willams s. Atic
another
D allowed translation of 's Minimal Translated Translation of written book to S/W Whelan v.Jaslow (Dist. CL Case)
book to S/W written book is infringement Russell v. Price
D created new S/W for new Substantial Minimal/ D only copied P's unprotected ideas Synercom v. Univ, Computing,
platform Ideas only SASs. Sidt
Make game substantially Minimal Total Audiovisual S/W is C/R; C/R of Midway v. Banda,;
similar to P's audiovisual S/W includes underl)ing Midwa, s. Attic.
pgm; D willful copying infringed P's Siam s. Kaufman:
C/R Atari s. Phillips;
Williams . Attic
Midway v. Dirkschneider;
Atari s. Amusement World;
Apple v. Franklin;
Midwa) v Strohon
To translate pgra to a Translated S/W Copied: C/R protection extends be)ond Midwa% v. Strohon;
different language for a to a new Structure. pgra's literal code to structure, Williams s. Attic
new market language Sequence, sequence &organization of pgm Arnstein v. Porter
and Stem V. Kaufman;
Organmzation SAS s. S&H;
Apple s. Franklin
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DATE CASE NAME LEL OF STAGE OF WINNER'S TYPE OF ECONOMIC R o.ArioNSnrr/ ACCES TO
CoURT PROCEEDINo CIRcLE SoFiwTAR BREACH or Durm SOFTWARE
COPIED
9/86 NEC % INTEL Dist Trial D's C/R Microcode D licensor of P/No Breach of Yes
645 F Supp. 590 N.D. Calif. valid, no duty
infringement
by P
10186 Broderbund v Unson DioL Trial P's valid C/R App. D had preliminary agreement Yes
648 F. Supp. 1127 N.D. Calif was infringed Printship S/W with P to translate P's pgtn;
Negotiations failed, D
breached duty to terminate
the translation process
1/87 Plains Cotton%. Goodpasture App. . 5th Preliinary P's C/R Application Ds were former employees of Yes
807 F.2d 1256 Cir. Prelim Injunction valid, no Cotton P/No Breach
Inj infringement Futures S/W
by D
3/87 Frybarger % IBM App Summary P's C/R Application Economic Relationship/ Yes
812 F 2d 525 9th dit. judgment valid. no Telecomm No Breach
infringement 5/W
by D
3/87 Digttal %. Softklone Dit Preliminary Separate Application No Economic Relafionship/ To user
659 F Supp. 449 N.D. Georgia Injunction &c Screen C/R Game No Breach interface
Permanent Valid/D
infringed
6/88 Vault Corp %. Quaid Software App. Preliminar No Application No Economic Relationship/ Yes
847 F-2d 255 5th Cir. Injunction Infringement Utility Pgrn No Breach
by D
7/88 Pearl Competition Elec. Dist. Declaratory D's C/R Application No Economic Relationship/ Yes
8 US-P.Q.2d 1520 S.D. FL judgment valid, P Timing No Breach
infringed Device
1/89 Manuf Tech. ,. CAMS Dist. Trial P's vaid C/R Application Economic Relationship/ Yes
706 F Supp. 984 D. Conn was infringed CAD/CAM Breached
9/89 Telemarketing%. Synsantec Dist. Summary No Application Economic Relationship/ Yes
12 U.S P.Q2d 1991 ND. Calif Judgment infringement Outline pgm No Breach
by D
9/89 S.OS ', Pa)da) App. Summary P's -alid CIR Application Economic Relationship/ Yes
886 F 2d 1081 9th Cir. [udgment was infringed AcctgPayroll Breached
10/89 ohnson Controls v. Phoenix App. Preliminary P's vahd CIR Application Economic Relationship/ Yes
886 F2d 1173 9th Cir. Injunction was infringed Process Breach
Control
6/90 Lotus %. Paperback Software Dist. Summary P's valid C/R Application No Economic Relationship/ Yes
740 F. Supp. 37 Mass. judgment was infringed Spreadsheet No Breach
* Cases reviewed but not found useful to analss:
Bngnoli' Balch. 645 F Supp 1201
D,,mmc' , Planning and Control. 646 F. Supp. 1127
Ashton-Tate %. Russ 728 F. Supp. 597
Apple V Microsoft. 717 F. Supp. 1428
Kehstall-Whire, % Mahar. 1990 WL 69013
ISC-Bunker % Altech. 1990 WL 103579
Allen Msland ' IBM. 1990 Corp. L Dec. P 26.631
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REAsoN FOR COPYING AmOUNT OF De.GEE OF LEGAL CONCUISIONS PLRcEDLE'r
WorX INOKINGERt COPYING
DiD
No Copying, P developed own Substantial Limited to Microcode is C/R. Apple v. Formula;
Microcode ideas Copying is excused when expression Apple v. Franklin
merges into idea
Migrate S/W for different Substantial some User interface was protectable Krofft . McDonald's;
computer uses expression; P's C/R violated by D's Synercom v. Un. Computing;
substantially similar interface Whelan v. Jaslow,
Arnstein v. Porter
Ds developed new competitise Substantial D copied D's structure, sequence and Apple v. Franklin;
ideas of P's organization determined by market; Apple Barrel ".. Beard;
pgm Idea/Expression merger Synercom %.. Ur. Computisg
Whelan v. jasow
No copying D developed None Ideas were substantially similar but Krofft v. McDonald's
Independent chosen aenues of expression were Atari v. Phillips;
work different Atar '.. Amusement World
Developed competing product Devel. done with Identical Substantially similar menu screen Whelan v. Jaslows
same menus infringed C/R on Menu Screen and Stein v. Kaufman;
functionality not C/R on pgm code Midway v. Strohon




No Copying. D developed Substantial None/only P's contractual restriction on Atari v. JS & A Group;
pgmn to defeat P's anticopying disassemble disassembl) and decompilation of Midway v. Stroson:
pgm pgm was unenforceable Whelan v,. Jaslow Midwa) v Attic
Develop competing product Some User interface User Interface C/R Atari". Phillips;




Plains Cotton v. Goodpasture;
S% ercom v. Univ. Computing;
Frbarger ,. IBM.
Apple Barrel '. Beard.
Digital %. Sofilone
Develop competing product Some User Interface Use interface valid C/R and was Broderbund .. Unison;
copies infringed Whelan %..Jaslow.
Dsgital % Softklone;
Arustem '.. Porter
Deelop competing product D de% eloped Substantial Only ideas or licensed expressions Whelan s. Jasow
both pgms min. copied Data East '. Epyx
work on 2nd
Deselop competing product Minimal Substantial D exceeded license thus its copumg Kroft '.. McDonald's;
infringed P's valid C/R Whelan %. jasow
Des elop competing product Minimal Total Nonliteral aspects of a computer Apple %. Formula.
program are protectable expression Fr.barsger'.. IBM;
rofft '. McDonald's
Develop competing product Minimal ,ork to Total Leel of abstractions test refined to Synercom .. Un. Computing;
deelop user a 3 part test Data Cash'. JS&A.
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As seen in Lotus, the scope of software copyright protection is
always a question of fact. Interestingly, all of the decisions have been
decided by judges, rather than juries. Given that judges are making
factual decisions concerning highly subjective factors (i.e.,Judge Hand's
level of abstractions analysis, the Broderbund "look and feel" test, and
now the Lotus three-part test), the relative equity and wholesomeness of
the parties will continue to play a critical, but only an implicit, part in the
decision process. In addition, sixteen of the twenty-five cases are at the
pretrial level where the burden of proof for preliminary injunctions and
temporary restraining orders is higher than at trial. In the cases at
pretrial, the alleged infringer lost in ten of those sixteen cases.
Although the cases overwhelmingly involved disputes over
application software, a few concerned operating system software. Of the
operating system software cases, Appe 14 2 and NEC v. Intel 143 are most
commonly cited. In Apple, the level of copyright protection clearly
included total copying of source code as well as code embedded in
firmware. NEC, the other major operating system software case, found
that in operating system software, technical constraints may only permit
a few or only one method of writing the program. In these specific
areas, the merger of idea and expression will be the dominant issue. In
operating system software copyright disputes, the alleged infringer will
most likely prevail if it has performed a substantial amount of
independent work, can show where idea and expression merge, and can
prove it with a clear paper trail.
Application software is the primary battle ground. The scope of
copyright protection shows a gradual increase of protection from literal
copying to protection of non-literal aspects including the structure,
sequence, and organization as in Whelan 144 and the user interface as in
Lotus. As the scope of software copyright is pushed to the edge of its
"envelope," the authors have noticed a subtle influence which the issues
of breach, amount of the alleged infringer's independent work, and
amount of actual copying done by the alleged infringer have on the trier
of fact in making the highly subjective factual decision on substantial
similarity.
In the fifteen cases in which there was an economic relationship, the
authors determined that nine alleged infringers had breached that
economic relationship. The classification of economic relationship is
somewhat subjective. The authors did not include alleged infringers
who had simply purchased a license to mass market software. Rather,
the classification of economic relationship is limited to those situations
where the copyright holder and the alleged infringer had some type of
ongoing economic relationship. Of these alleged infringers who also
had breached an economic relationship, all nine were found to have
infringed valid copyrights. This unanimous court determination of
142. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
143. 645 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
144. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
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infringement is not unexpected to the authors, given the highly
subjective and factually intense decision the trier of fact must make, as
well as the undoubtedly subtle influence the trier of fact must feel from
knowing there was a breach of economic relationship by the alleged
infringer.
In all copyright disputes, access and similarity are the two critical
elements to prove infringement. Naturally, in each case where
infringement was found, access had occurred. The access issue in
copying of source code, object code, firmware, and the internal
structure, sequence, and organization is critical, and usually has
occurred in conjunction with a breach of an economic relationship. In
the non-literal element disputes, including the user interface, access can
almost be assumed, in that any competent software programmer has
undoubtedly seen, and probably even used, the software which is being
cloned.
The next three columns each build on the thesis of the authors that
the relative equity or wholesomeness of the alleged infringer plays a
critical, but subtle, role in the decisional process of the trier of fact. The
three columns show the reasons for copying, the amount of work
performed by the alleged infringer (including the innovative items
added), and the degree of copying. For the alleged infringers in Lotus,
their goal was to make as identical a copy of the Lotus spreadsheet as
possible, and even eliminate several innovations. With the benefit of
hindsight, of course, the position of the authors is that an alleged
infringer which slavishly copies software will probably be found guilty of
infringement, given the inherent subjective process the trier of fact goes
through in arriving at the decision of substantial similarity. The amount
of work done by the alleged infringer supplements the decision
concerning the relative equity and wholesomeness of the alleged
infringer.
Of the seven cases where the authors could determine the amount
of work done by the alleged infringer was substantial, only one of the
alleged infringers, Unison, was found guilty of infringement. All of the
rest of the infringers were found not to have infringed. In Broderbund,
the economic relationship had been terminated, after which the
defendant continued to use identical lines of the plaintiff's code in its
program. For the degree of copying classification, the authors
determined that of the twelve alleged infringers who had substantially
copied, ten were found guilty of infringement. The remaining two cases
were Data Cash v. JS & A Group,14 5 which concerned lack of copyright
notice and public domain issues, and Telemarketing v. Symantec,1 46 which
involved licensing of copyrightable expression.
The advice to software developers is that good guys almost always
win, and mudballs almost always lose. After reviewing these selected
cases, counsel advising software developers can greatly influence the
145. 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
146. 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
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outcome of any infringement suit by several relatively simple
suggestions. In the operating system area, counsel should alert software
developers of the idea/expression dichotomy, and have them
appropriately document, with contemporaneous memos, why the
software developer wrote the operating system software in the manner
in which it was written, why certain design decisions were made, and
explanations as to why some decision choices were limited to a few or
even one option. If the developer is working on a software application
which has any similarities to an existing application, counsel should
focus on whether any economic relationship exists and ensure that no
breach occurs. In addition, counsel should ensure that the software
developer is not merely slavishly cloning software as the reason for the
development, but rather is seeking to improve the existing product with
substantial independent work. With these general guidelines, counsel
can steer software developers away from the vast majority of
infringement actions.
VI. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The copyrightability of the literal components of computer software
is no longer an issue. The copyrightability of the non-literal aspects,
however, remains uncertain. Rather than provide guidance as to what
may or may not constitute infringement of non-literal elements of com-
puter programs, the Lotus decision has increased the confusion and anxi-
ety within the computer industry. The greatest fear among industry
executives is that a legal free-for-all could develop, having a chilling ef-
fect on product development. Progress could be retarded due to fear of
legal reprisals. Strategic litigation could become an accepted business
practice in the computer industry.
14 7
Many observers in the software field have cried foul after the Lotus
decision and subsequent threats and actual suits by Lotus against other
software developers. The authors believe that these cases have a logical
pattern which is evolving into a set of rules and procedures for software
developers to follow in developing new software products. Indeed,
upon review of the selected cases, Lotus was not the major watershed
case it first appeared to be, given the earlier Digital Communications 1
4 8
and Pearl v. Competition Elec. 14 9 cases. The software industry had ex-
pected Lotus to provide a definite bright line test regarding copyright
infringement for non-literal aspects of computer software. The Lotus
court, however, determined that a bright line test is not possible, given
the complex factual issues which must be analyzed in each case.
Although the software development industry is still growing, the indus-
147. The founder of Lotus Development Corporation, Mitchell D. Kapor, stated that
the "uneasiness of the industry shot up after Lotus sued Borland.... Lotus winning the
Paperback suit has had an enormous destabilizing effect on the industry. This whole thing
is starting to unravel and nobody knows what is going to happen." New York Times, supra
note 136 at F4, col. 1.
148. 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
149. 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1520 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
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try is beginning to mature and will continue to mature in the 1990s.
Given this maturing process, intellectual property law, including copy-
rights, will play an ever increasing role in the software industry.
Public policy underlying copyright protection dictates that innova-
tion and new expressions be encouraged by appropriate levels of protec-
tion. Software developers are certainly permitted to stand on the
shoulders of giants in their quest to create new and innovative software.
When a software developer discards innovation for the sole purpose of
slavishly copying the work of another, public policy requires that this
slavish copying be prohibited. The Lotus court was correct in its refer-
ence to Sir Isaac Newton's observation that innovators must stand on
the shoulders of previous giants. The authors would respectfully sup-
plement Newton's observation by adding that on the shoulders of gi-
ants, may no mudballs stand.

